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Chapter 1
Introduction
This paper looks at the submissions for round 2 of a competition held by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) to find an encryption standard resistant to attacks by
post-quantum computers. NIST announced its call for submissions in February 2016 with a
deadline of November 2017 and announced the 69 algorithms that made the cut for round
1. In January 2019 the candidates for round 2 were announced with round 3 projected for
2020/2021.
1.1 Motivation
As quantum computers become more common the need for a new encryption standard be-
comes more prominent since they can potentially provide the power to brute force current
encryption standards in a relatively short amount of time. Because of this NIST has begun
looking for a new encryption standard that is secure against quantum computers.
In addition to security, the performance is an important factor when considering a new
encryption standard. This study looks at all the round 2 submissions and compares the
category 1 implementations (equivalent to AES-128) in terms of encryption/decryption time
and its memory footprint.
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Chapter 2
Background
This section gives a brief description of each submission along with the data collected from
benchmarking. Each submission falls into one of three catagories: code-based, lattice-based
or elliptic curve-based. Each of these have their respective trade-offs which will be discussed
before getting into the submissions themselves.
2.1 Code-based submissions
Code-based cryptography refers to encryption schemes that use error correcting code. The
advantage of code based schemes is that they are generally faster with the tradeoff of larger
key sizes. A well known example of this is Classic McEliece which has been around for about
thirty years and still does not have any known attacks even with a quantum computer. In the
case of Classic McEliece, it uses a random code as the private key and a randomly permuted
version of that code as the public key while the ciphertext is a codeword with errors that
only the private key can decipher [1].
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2.2 Lattice based submissions
Lattice based cryptography relies on the difficulty of problems related to lattices, namely
finding the shortest non-zero vector in an arbitrary basis that represents a lattice. The most
common variation of these schemes are Learning With Errors (LWE) and Ring Learning
With Errors (RLWE). While this is a more recent method, it is thought to be secure against
quantum computers [2].
2.3 Multivariate based submissions
Mutivariate cryptography schemes have their security based on the multivariate quadratic
polynomial problem. This problem has been proven to be non-deterministic polynomial
time over any field and believed to be hard on both classical and quantum computers [3].
Multivariate encryption is a popular choice amongst the signature schemes and its main
advantages include its speed, modest computational requirements, and short signatures while
its main drawback is its large public key sizes.
2.4 Elliptic Curve based submissions
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is already widely used and well studied. While traditional
ECC is more easily broken by quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm isogeny based
schemes are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks [4].
2.5 Encryption Schemes
The following submissions are key encapsulation methods, an encryption scheme that uses
a public key to create a ciphertext containing a symmetric key and in order to decrypt one
must have the correct private key. This is primarily used for transmitting data that needs
7
to be secured over an insecure network.
2.5.1 BIKE
Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation (BIKE) is a code based submission which uses Quasi-Cyclic
Moderate Density Parity-Check (QC-MDPC) code using bit-flipping coding techniques [5].
All variations of BIKE make use of ephemeral keys to protect against the GJS Reaction
attack. BIKE has three variations of the scheme, each one with their optimizations focused
on different areas; the exact differences and advantages/disadvantages each one has over the
other can be found in the specification document.
2.5.2 Classic McEliece
While most code-based submissions are based off of the cryptosystem developed by McEliece
in 1978 they all make their own adjustments whereas Classic McElice, as the name would im-
ply, uses the original design which still doesn’t have any known effective attacks [6]. Classic
McEliece uses a random Goppa code and adds random errors in order to encrypt the mes-
sage. This is extremely secure however as the documentation states, it comes at the cost of
efficiency, with very large key sizes and key generation times. The documentation also claims
that the hardware implementation is noticeably faster than the software implementation.
2.5.3 HQC
Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) is a code based encryption scheme proved IND-CPA assum-
ing the hardness of the Syndrome Decoding on structured code [7]. Some of the other
features it chooses to highlight are that the assumption that the family of codes being used
is indistinguishable among random codes is not required and that it features a decryption
failure probability analysis. HQC claims to be immune against attacks aiming at recovering
the hidden structure of the code being used. A limitation of HQC is the low encryption rate;
8
increasing this rate requires increasing its other parameters.
2.5.4 NTS-KEM
NTS-KEM can be seen as variant of the McEliece and Niederreiter public key encryption
schemes, however it is not concerned with the secure communication of an encrypted message
but rather the secure communication of a random key [8]. NTS-KEM claims to have strong
security guarantees and demonstrates a tight relationship between the IND-CCA security
of NTS-KEM and the problem of inverting the McEliece PKE scheme. It also claims to be
very flexible allowing for more fine-tuning of trade-offs. One of the notable disadvantages of
NTS-KEM as noted by the documentation is the large key size.
2.5.5 ROLLO
ROLLO is a compilation of three other code based encryption schemes; namely LAKE,
LOCKER, and Rank-Ouroboros. All three are based on rank metric codes and share the
same decryption algorithm for Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) codes [9]. ROLLO is designed
to be efficient with its key size and computational complexity while also having a constant
time decoding algorithm and a well studied failure probability. A limitation noted in the
documentation is the fact that the harness of the problem ROLLO uses is relatively recent
and is still being studied but considered hard by the community.
2.5.6 RQC
Rank Quasi-Cyclic is very similar to HQC and has the same advantages with the addition of
the decryption algorithm being deterministic, thus having a decryption failure rate of zero,
and having more attractive parameters than most Hamming based proposals [10]. It also
shares the same limitations as HQC, namely that the hardness needs to be better studied
and is difficult to improve on complexity.
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2.5.7 CRYSTALS-Kyber
The Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices (CRYSTALs) key encapsulation method
named Kyber has its security based on the hardness of the LWE in module lattices prob-
lem [11]. The construction of Kyber has a two-stage approach: the IND-CPA-secure public-
key encryption scheme is introduced and encrypts messages of a fixed length of 32 bytes.
Then a slightly tweaked Fujisaki–Okamoto (FO) transform is used to construct the IND-
CCA2-secure KEM. Some of the notable advantages of Kyber according to the documen-
tation include its ease of implementation and scalability. Its limitations come compared to
other lattice-based schemes where various implementations have different trade-offs on se-
curity or efficiency. Ring Learning-with-errors for example requires many more outputs in
order to extract a matrix from a seed.
2.5.8 FrodoKEM
FrodoKEM is a lattice based encryption scheme designed to be conservative yet practical and
derives its security from from cautious parameterizations of the well-studied LWE problem,
which in turn has close connections to conjectured-hard problems on generic, “algebraically
unstructured” lattices [12]. Some of the advantages FrodoKEM’s documentation claims to
have include its ease of implementation, compatibility with current schemes, potential for an
efficient hardware implementation, and resistance to side-channel attacks. The disadvantage
of this scheme is its large key size.
2.5.9 LAC
Lattice-based Cryptosystems (LAC) is a cryptographic suite that derives its strength from
the RWLE problem. LAC achieves the required security but its focus is on size [13]. Some
of the advantages as specified in the documentation include its consideration for multiple
implementations such as the parallel design making it a very sutible design for multi-core
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processors. Other advantages include the simplicity and flexibility of the design. Some of
the limitations include an inability to be sped up on processors that do not support vector
instructions and a sacrifice of efficiency to protect against timing attacks.
2.5.10 NewHope
New Hope is a lattice based encryption scheme described as a variant of the encryption
scheme by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev which uses RWLE while also applying size
reduction techniques [14]. The main advantages according to the documentation include its
performance, ease of implementation, and conservative design. Some of its limitations are its
small noise distribution, limited parameterization, and restrictions due to usage of Number
Theory Transform.
2.5.11 NTRU
The lattice based scheme this implementation is based of off, NTRU, was first described
by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman with some changes by Hülsing, Rijnveld, Schanck, and
Schwabe [15]. This scheme has a tight proof of IND-CCA2 security in the random oracle
model assuming the DPKE is OW-CPA secure while also being secure in the quantum
random oracle model. Some of the advantages include the fact that it is well studied, its
flexibility, speed, and lack of a patent while some of its limitations include its size and lack
of understanding when it comes to optimal parameters.
2.5.12 NTRU-Prime
NTRU-Prime is described as prime-degree large-Galois-group inert-modulus ideal-lattice-
based cryptography which takes away various mathematical tools from an attacker [16].
Some of the advantages of NTRU-Prime include it being resistant to side-channel analysis
and its efficiency. Some of the disadvantages mentioned in the paper include the security
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levels being widely separated.
2.5.13 Round5
Round5 is a lattice based merger of 2 submissions: Round2 and HILA5 deriving its security
from the General Learning With Rounding problem. It uses an error-correcting code to
decrease decryption failure probability granting smaller key sizes and better performance [17].
Some of Round5’s advantages include its flexibility, small public-key and ciphertext, and
efficiency while no major limitations are specified in the documentation.
2.5.14 ThreeBears
ThreeBears is based on the lattice based Lyubashevsky-Peikert-Regev and Ding RWLE cryp-
tosystems while also deriving from NewHope and Kyber. The main difference with Three-
Bears is that it derives its security from the integers modulo a generalized Mersenne number,
thereby making it integer module learning with errors, similar to Gu’s work [18]. Some of the
advantages of ThreeBears include its simplicity, size, and speed while its disadvantages in-
clude the fact that the problem it derives its security from is still fairly novel and potentially
being more complex to protect from side channel or hybrid attacks.
2.5.15 SIKE
Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) is an elliptic curve based submission which
uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange enhanced with supersingular isogeny in order to protect
from quantum attacks [19]. The main advantages of SIKE are its small key sizes and how
widely used and well studied ECC has been. The large amount of studies surrounding
ECC allows most of the knowledge, such as implementations that avoid side-channel attacks,
surrounding it to be transferred to SIKE. The main disadvantage of SIKE is its performance,
taking orders of magnitude longer than the lattice or code based submissions.
12
2.6 Signature schemes
The following submissions are digital signature algorithms which also make use of asymetric
cryptography but have the objective of ensuring that the data received is truly from who it
is claimed to be from.
2.6.1 Crystals-Dilithium
Dilithium is based on the ”Fiat-Shamir with Aborts” approach; this technique uses rejection
sampling for compactness and security [20]. To be more efficient Dilithium uses a uniform
distribution instead of the traditional Gaussian distribution. It shares most of the advantages
and disadvantages that Kyber has such as its ease of implementation and small key size.
2.6.2 FALCON
Fast-Fourier Lattice-based Compact Signatures over NTRU (FALCON) has its security based
on NTRU lattices and uses fast Fourier sampling as a trapdoor sampler [21]. FALCON was
designed to be compact and thus this is its main advantage. Some of its other advantages
include fast signature generation and verification, a modular design, and a message recov-
ery mode. Some of the disadvantages documented in the specification include its delicate
implementation, floating point arithmetic, and a lack of information on side-channel attacks.
2.6.3 qTesla
qTesla has its security based on the hardness of RLWE and is claimed to be an efficient vari-
ant of the Bai-Galbraith signature scheme which is based on the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts
framework. It is designed to be simple, practical, and portable [22]. Some of the advantages
according to the documentation of qTesla include its tight security foundation and ease of im-
plementation and integration with other libraries. Although no disadvantages are explicitly
stated, it likely suffers the same disadvantages most lattice-based submissions suffer.
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2.6.4 GeMSS
A Great Multivariate Short Signature (GeMSS) is a multivariate signature scheme based off
the QUARTZ and Gui signature schemes [23]. GeMSS is claimed to be a faster variant of
QUARTZ, which currently has no practical attack reported against it. The main advantage
GeMSS is centered around is its efficiency while its main drawback is the public key size
being rather large.
2.6.5 MQDSS
MQDSS has its security based on the multivariate quadratic problem and follows the Fiat-
Shamir paradigm of transforming identification schemes to signatures using the 5-Pass SSH
scheme [24]. Some of the advantages MQDSS is designed to have are its small key sizes,
security of the multivariate quadratic problem, simplicity, and ability to be parallelized.
Some of the disadvantages described in the documentation include its large signature size
and the problems associated with rewinding of the adversary and adaptively programming
the random oracle.
2.6.6 Rainbow
Rainbow is a multivariate signature scheme originally proposed in 2005 and adapted for a
post quantum application. It is described as a multi-layer Oil-Vinegar system [25]. Some
of the advantages documented in the specification include its effiency, short signatures, and
simplicity while the disadvantage is its large public and private key size.
2.6.7 LUOV
Lifted Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar has its security based on multivariate cryptography
while attempting to reduce the size of public keys generally associated with oil and vinegar
systems. [26] Some of the advantages the documentation makes note of include its small
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signature and secret key, wide security margin, and flexibility. While the public key size is
much smaller than that of other multivariate schemes, it’s still quite large and considered
one of LUOV’s limitations although this is a trade-off for the small signature size and can
be modified depending on the application.
2.6.8 Picnic
Picnic is unique in the sense that it does not rely on the harness of any mathematical
problem, relying instead on zero-knowledge proof (i.e. one party can prove to the other that
it knows a secret without disclosing the secret). Picnic has two variations, one that uses the
Fiat-Shamir transform which is secure in the random oracle model (but also has no known
quantum attacks) and the Unruh transform, secure in the quantum ransom oracle model but
crates a larger signature [27].
2.6.9 SPHINCS+
SPHINCS+ is a stateless hash-based signature scheme, it authenticates a large number of
few-time signature key pairs using hyper trees [28]. Some of the advantages the documen-
tation claims SPHINCS+ to have are its small key sizes and that it is probably the most
conservative design of a post-quantum signature scheme thanks to its minimal security as-
sumptions. Its drawback is the signature size being quite large and its speed.
15
Chapter 3
Performance Analysis of Submissions
This chapter will go over how the methodology used to collect data on the performance of
each scheme. Specifically, the time each program took to encrypt and decrypt was measured
along with its memory footprint. The findings of the experiment and some comments on
each scheme are also found in this chapter.
3.1 Methodology
All timing measurements were made using the standard time.h package which allows for
nanosecond precision. The following code was used to measure encryption/decryption time.
It ran encryption and decryption 1000 times and took the average times for each.
The program included with each submission for testing was also paused and the pmap
function was used to record memory usage. This information can be useful for evaluating the
viability of devices with limited memory such as embedded systems. While there may minor
variations with how each submission implemented their program the memory usage recorded
from this should still be a good approximation. Another important factor to consider is the
key size as each encryption scheme has its own tradeoff of key size vs. speed in addition to
the consideration for security.
16
1 crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk);
2 for(int i = 0; i < TESTCOUNT; i++){
3 clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &start);
4 crypto_kem_enc(c,k1,pk);
5 clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &end);
6 encTime += BILLION * (end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec)
7 + end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
8 clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &start);
9 crypto_kem_dec(k2,c,sk);
10 clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &end);
11 decTime += BILLION * (end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec)
12 + end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
13 }
14
15 encTime = encTime/TESTCOUNT;
16 decTime = decTime/TESTCOUNT;
17
18 printf("Encrypt time: %lu \n",encTime);
19 printf("Decrypt time: %lu \n",decTime);
Listing 1: Code used for measuring time to encrypt/decrypt
This was done on a computer with an Intel i7-3520M @2.90 GHz (Ivy Bridge) running
Xubuntu (a variant of Ubuntu 18.10 using the Xfce desktop environment).
3.2 Measurements
All timing measurements were made using the standard time.h library, specifically it used
the monotonic clock. The monotonic clock allows elapsed time to be measured from an
arbitrary point in time as opposed to a real time clock which would measure the difference
between the system’s best guess of the time at the beginning and end. Unless otherwise
noted, all implementations were run as is with the default compiler options in the makefile.
Table 3.3 shows the average time elapsed from immediately before and after the encap-
sulation and decapsulation functions using the NIST Known Answer Tests (KATs). Table
3.4 shows the memory footprint, the ‘Memory’ refers to how much memory is allocated
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to the process while the Resident Set Size (RSS) shows how much of that is actually lo-
cated in RAM. The ‘Unique’ columns refer to the memory allocated excluding any libraries
which may already be loaded on the device running the encryption scheme, this also excludes
anonymous memory and the stack as these may also be attributed in part to shared libraries.
3.3 Encryption schemes
This section details the measurements obtained for the encryption schemes using the methods
above. It will describe how each scheme compares to the others and issues or modifications
if any were necessary.
Scheme Encrypt (ms) Decrypt (ms) Public Key (bits) Private Key (bits)
BIKE 0.167 1.963 1988 3090
HQC 1.068 1.597 2500 320
NTSKEM 0.034 0.234 319488 9248
ROLLO 0.179 0.596 3720 320
RQC 0.635 3.221 6824 320
Classic McEliece 0.091 22.856 2088960 51616
CRYSTALS-Kyber 0.211 0.263 13056 6400
FrodoKEM 0.718 0.694 159104 76928
LAC 0.064 0.091 4352 4096
NewHope 0.297 0.338 7424 15104
NTRU 1.361 3.927 5592 7480
NTRU Prime 8.598 19.995 7952 12144
Round5 0.067 0.024 5408 5664
ThreeBears 0.036 0.057 320 6432
SIKE 35.048 37.435 2992 2768
Table 3.1: Key sizes (in bits) and timings of encryption and decryption of schemes
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Scheme Memory (kB) RSS (kB) Unique Memory (kB) Unique RSS (kB)
BIKE 18872 6544 56 56
HQC 17788 5496 64 64
NTSKEM 6936 4364 116 116
ROLLO 17784 5508 52 52
RQC 17784 5628 60 60
Classic McEliece 2564 1680 132 132
CRYSTALS-Kyber 5496 3084 40 40
FrodoKEM 7116 3248 60 60
LAC 5544 3140 88 88
NewHope 5492 2744 36 36
NTRU 5500 2908 44 44
NTRU Prime 2564 1544 132 128
Round5 5608 3140 152 152
ThreeBears 5560 2960 104 104
SIKE 2564 1680 132 132
Table 3.2: Memory footprint of encryption schemes
3.3.1 BIKE
BIKE is fairly quick when encrypting, however it is slightly slower than most other schemes
when it comes to decrypting. It also has one of the larger key sizes, although this is expected
for code-based algorithms. BIKE had very similar performance between its reference imple-
mentation and optimized implementation, however in the reference implementation BIKE-1
was the default whereas in the optimized implementation BIKE-2 was chosen and this had
better performance. As for the memory profile, while it has the most memory allocated
when accounting for the libraries, the memory of the encrypt/decrypt program itself is on
the smaller end. The values shown in tables 3.3 and 3.4 refer to BIKE-2 targeting category
1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.2 HQC
The optimized implementation of HQC appears to be incompatible with the timing method
used for the other encryption schemes. Using the same code that was used to time other
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schemes causes it to fail to compile and changing some compiler options in the makefile
allow it to compile but cause an illegal instruction when attempting to run it. Thus the
information in the table refers to the reference implementation of HQC-128-1 which may
have worse performance than the optimized implementation. With this in mind, it is also
worth noting that the key sizes are very small. HQC has one of the larger memory footprints
with libraries accounted for but still fairly small when looking at the memory the program
itself uses.
3.3.3 NTS-KEM
NTS-KEM is one of the faster schemes in both encryption and decryption but this comes at
the cost of the second largest public key size and a fairly large private key. NTS-KEM had
a significant improvement when going from the reference implementation to the optimized
implementation, it was about 10 times faster than the reference implementation. The mem-
ory footprint is not particularly large or small when considering the use of libraries but the
encrypt/decrypt is among the schemes that use a larger amount of memory. The values in
the tables refer to the optimized implementation of NTS-KEM(12,64) which targets category
1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.4 ROLLO
ROLLO is fairly fast and has the smallest key sizes among the code-based submissions and is
still one of the smaller options overall in terms of key size. The optimized version of ROLLO
was about 1.4 times faster when compared to the reference implementation. ROLLO has
a large memory footprint with all its libraries accounted for but has one of the smallest
footprints on its own. The values in the tables refer to the optimized implementation of
ROLLO-I-128, targeting category 1 IND-CCA security.
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3.3.5 RQC
RQC is one of the slower encryption schemes but it has fairly small key sizes; it is tied with
ROLLO for the smallest private key. The optimized implementation of RQC was marginally
faster than the reference implementation. RQC, like most of the code based encryption
schemes has a fairly large memory footprint when accounting for all the libraries but uses
comparatively little memory on its own. The values in the tables refer to the optimized
implementation of RQC128, targeting category 1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.6 Classic McEliece
Classic McEliece has one of the fastest encryption times, however it has the second slowest
decryption time and some of the largest key sizes; its public key is the largest overall.
It is extremely secure so it may be useful is specific scenarios where data is encrypted
often but decrypted infrequently. The optimized implementation is a copy of the reference
implementation. The values in the tables refer to McEliece348864, which targets category
1 IND-CCA security. Classic McEliece has one of the smallest memory footprints when
accounting for the libraries but it’s among the schemes that require the most amount of
memory on its own, likely due to the large key sizes. The version used for this experiment
was downloaded from the submitter website rather than the NIST submission page as there
were issues compiling the the version on the NIST website while the one on the submitter
website used OpenSSL.
3.3.7 Crystals-Kyber
Crystal-Kyber is not particularly fast or slow, its public key is larger than most but far from
the largest while its private key is about in the middle. The optimized and reference imple-
mentations had very little difference in performance. The memory footprint in comparison to
other schemes is fairly small both when considering the libraries and the memory allocated
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for the program itself. The values in the tables refer to the optimized implementation of
Kyber512, targeting category 1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.8 FrodoKEM
FrodoKEM is one of the slower implementations and has very large keys; it has the largest
private key overall. The optimized implementation is about 4 times faster than the reference
implementation. FrodoKEM does not have a particularly large or small memory footprint
with libraries included but the memory allocated specifically for it is fairly small. The
values in the table refer to the optimized version of FrodoKEM-640, which targets category
1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.9 LAC
LAC is one of the fastest schemes for both encryption and decryption and both the private
and public key are among the smallest of all submissions. The optimized implementation of
LAC is about 3 times faster than the reference implementation. When considering the mem-
ory footprint in comparison to other schemes, the memory allocated including the libraries
is fairly small while the memory allocated specifically for it is not particularly large or small.
The values in the tables refer to the speed test of LAC128, targeting category 1 IND-CCA
security.
3.3.10 New Hope
New Hope is not especially fast nor slow and it has a larger key size than most, however these
key sizes are far from the largest. There is almost no difference in performance between the
reference and optimized implementation. New Hope has a small memory footprint with the
libraries included and the smallest amount of memory allocated specifically for it among the
compared schemes. The values in the table refer to NewHope512CCA which targets category
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1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.11 NTRU
NTRU is one of the slower schemes but its key sizes are relatively small. There is little
difference in performance between the optimized and reference implementation. NTRU has
a fairly small footprint both when considering the memory allocated both with and without
including libraries. The values in the tables refer to NTRU-HRSS701, targeting category 1
IND-CCA security.
3.3.12 NTRU Prime
NTRU Prime is one of the slowest schemes overall, it also has fairly large key sizes. The
optimized implementation is a copy of the reference implementation so there is no difference
in performance. NTRU Prime has the smallest memory footprint of all compared schemes
when considering the memory allocated for libraries but one of the largest when considering
memory allocated specifically for it. The values in the tables refer to SNTRUP653 which
targets category 1 IND-CCA security.
3.3.13 Round5
Round5 is very fast and has some of the smallest key sizes. The optimized implementation
has significantly better performance than the reference implementation, nearly 100 times
faster. Round5 has a small memory footprint when including the libraries’ memory usage
but has the largest amount of memory allocated specifically for it in comparison to other
schemes. The values in the tables refer to R5ND-1KEM-0D, targeting category 1 IND-CCA
security.
23
3.3.14 Three Bears
Three bears is very fast and has small keys, including the smallest public key. The optimized
implementation is over 20 times faster than the reference implementation. The values in the
tables refer to BabyBear which targets category 1 IND-CCA security. The memory footprint
when considering libraries is fairly small while the footprint specific to the encrypt/decrypt
program is not particularly large or small relative to other schemes. In order for the code
responsible for timing to work the compiler flag -std=c11 needed to be removed, this may
cause minor changes to performance.
3.3.15 SIKE
SIKE has the longest encryption and decryption times, however it also has some of the
smallest keys. The optimized implementation is over 10 times faster than the reference
implementation. The values in the tables refer to SIKEp434, targeting category 1 IND-CCA
security. This is the uncompressed implementation, with compression the key size can be
even smaller at the sacrifice of speed. The memory footprint is one of the smallest when
considering libraries while the amount of memory allocated for it specifically is among the
largest.
3.4 Signature Schemes
Signature schemes were measured the same way as the encryption schemes, using the same
library and code to measure signing and verifying time. Unlike the encryption schemes,
however, many of the signature schemes did not have a version optimized for the test plat-
form. In order to have all platforms be on equal ground the data collected and shown in
the tables come from the reference implementation. For the signature schemes that did have
an optimized version compatible with the test platform, the performance difference will be
noted when going into more detail for each scheme.
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Scheme Sign (ms) Verify (ms) Public Key (bits) Signature (bits)
Dilithium 0.840 0.101 9472 16352
LUOV 14.165 9.911 99496 256
FALCON 0.078 0.016 7176 6472
GeMSS 18.099 13.344 384000 282
MQDSS 45.327 32.153 128 166832
Picnic 45.525 29.817 32 34032
qTesla 0.187 0.03 119040 20736
Rainbow 0.173 0.138 152576 512
SPHINCS+ 50.62 2.083 64640 256
Table 3.3: Key sizes (in bits) and timings of signature schemes
Scheme Memory (kB) RSS (kB) Unique Memory (kB) Unique RSS (kB)
Dilithium 5524 3048 68 68
LUOV 5964 3096 508 220
FALCON 4300 2708 256 256
GeMSS 19476 8388 160 160
MQDSS 5556 3180 40 40
Picnic 3752 2044 1052 232
qTesla 5532 3016 76 76
Rainbow 6952 5348 76 76
SPHINCS+ 5508 3156 52 52
Table 3.4: Memory footprint of signature schemes
3.4.1 CRYSTALS-Dilithium
Dilithium when compared to all other signature schemes is among the faster option with a
fairly small public key and signature size. Comparing Dilithium to the other lattice based
entries makes it the slowest but also the smallest in terms of its key and signature size.
The performance in the tables refers to Dilithium2 as it is equivalent to NIST security
level 1. Interestingly, one can get better performance by using Dilithium1, however this has
a security level below that of NIST’s lowest level. Dilithium does not have an optimized
version with its submission.
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3.4.2 FALCON
FALCON is the fastest of all schemes and has a fairly small public key and signature.
FALCON512 was used to obtain the values in the tables. Using the optimized version would
cause signatures to fail for an unknown reason, this may be due to something being incom-
patible with the test platform.
3.4.3 qTesla
qTesla is one of the fastest signature schemes but also has the third largest public key and
signature. qTesla I was used to obtain the values in the tables, it targets NIST security
level I and does not have an optimized version.
3.4.4 GeMSS
GeMSS is not particularly fast nor slow in comparison to other schemes and although it has
the largest public key, it has one of the smallest signatures. RedGemss128 was used as it
had the best performance while the other variations traded off performance for additional
security. In the optimized version, the sign time was about 10 times faster and the verification
time 100 times faster.
3.4.5 MQDSS
MQDSS was one of the slowest signature schemes and has a fairly large signature, however
it has one of the smallest public keys. mqdss-48 was used to obtain the values shown in the
tables, the optimized version appears to be incompatible with the test platform.
3.4.6 Rainbow
Rainbow is one of the fastest signature schemes and has one of the smallest signatures but
has the second largest public key. Rainbow Ia classic was used to obtain the values in the
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tables and the optimized version has a slightly faster signing time and is about twice as fast
to verify. The flag -std=c11 needed to be removed from the makefile in order for the library
used for timing to be compatible.
3.4.7 LUOV
LUOV is fairly fast and is tied for the smallest signature while its public key is not particularly
large or small. luov-8-58-237-keccak was used to obtain the values in the tables. The
optimized version has a signature time about 7 times faster and verification time about 10
times faster.
3.4.8 Picnic
Picnic is among the slower signature schemes and has the largest signature, however it has
the smallest public key by far. Picnicl1fs was used to obtain the values in the tables. The
optimized version tells a very different story and puts Picnic as the fastest in terms of sign
time with an average sign time of 0.007 ms and a verify time of 3.068 ms.
3.4.9 SPHINCS+
SPHINCS+ is tied for the smallest signature, its public key is not particularly large or small
compared to other signature schemes, and it’s not particularly fast or slow when it comes
to verifying, however it has the slowest sign time. sphincs-sha256-128f-simple was used
to obtain the values in the table and the optimized version had very similar performance
compared to the reference version. The flag -std=c99 needed to be removed in the makefile
in order for the code responsible for timing to be compatible.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
For both encryption and signature, each scheme makes it own performance trade-off to ei-
ther minimize key size or maximize speed. Another important factor in evaluating signature
schemes is the signature size, as reducing the key size usually required increasing signature
size and vice versa. The NIST page for post-quantum encryption states that multiple sub-
missions may be selected. Different scenarios may have different priorities when it comes to
performance so having more than one standard would allow each user to use what is best
suited for each application. This study considered the security of each scheme equal and
compared them purely on performance; with this in mind some notable encryption schemes
include ThreeBears, LAC, and Round5 as these were among the fastest while maintaining
fairly small keys, albeit not the smallest. FALCON and CRYSTALS-Dilithium both have
the public key and signature amongst the smallest while remaining fairly fast. While these
schemes are balanced, the schemes with the smallest public key or signature is still multiple
orders of magnitude smaller so depending on the application one may prefer another scheme.
Future work that could use information from this study would include taking into account
the security when comparing the trade-offs one makes with each scheme. While all schemes
were tested with the version that corresponds to NIST level 1 security, some implementations
may be more secure than others and this was not really considered in this study.
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